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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GREGORY N. OLIVER, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
Supreme Court 
Case No. 
Court of Appeals 
Case No. 890625-CA 
Priority No. 13 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does a criminal defense attorney have 
a duty to prepare the defense and investigate 
evidence which is "cumulative" to, or 
corroborative of, the defendant's testimony? 
2. How is a criminal defense attorney on 
direct appeal to present evidence, which was not 
originally presented in the trial court, to 
establish ineffective assistance of trial counsel? 
OPINION AND ORDER OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The court of appeals' opinion and order denying rehearing 
are in Appendix 1 to this petition. 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
The court of appeals filed State v. Oliver. 170 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 44 (Utah App. 1991), on September 26, 1991. Counsel for 
Mr. Oliver filed a Petition for Rehearing on October 9, 1991. The 
court of appeals denied Mr. Oliver's Petition for Rehearing on 
October 17, 1991. This Petition for Writ of Certiorari is timely 
under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 48(a). 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2-2(3)(a) and (5) (Supp. 1991) 
provide this Court's jurisdiction over this Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The full text of the following provisions is contained in 
Appendix 2 to this petition. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I Section 7; 
Constitution of Utah, Article I Section 12; 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI; 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, 
section 1. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
A jury convicted Mr. Oliver of burglary, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. section 76-2-202, and theft, 
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. section 
76-6-404, in the Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable 
Michael R. Murphy, Judge, presiding. Judge Murphy sentenced 
Mr. Oliver to prison for concurrent terms of zero to five and one to 
fifteen years, and ordered Mr. Oliver to pay restitution 
(R. 166-167). 
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed Mr. Oliver's burglary 
conviction and reversed Mr. Oliver's theft conviction, remanding the 
case to the trial court to reduce Mr. Oliver's third degree felony 
theft conviction to a class A misdemeanor theft conviction. 
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State v. Oliver, 170 Utah Adv. Rep. at 44. 
The court of appeals denied Mr. Oliver's Petition for 
Rehearing. 
B. FACTS 
The court of appeals' "background" discussion is an 
adequate description of the facts underlying Mr. Oliver's 
convictions. State v. Oliver, 170 Utah Adv. Rep. 44, 44-45 (Utah 
App. 1991). For purposes of this petition, this Court should be 
aware of two additional events. 
1. Trial Counsel's Admission 
On the morning that trial was scheduled to begin, in 
support of Mr. Oliver's motion for a continuance, which motion the 
trial court denied, trial counsel stated in open court, 
I didn't do any formal trial preparation that I 
normally do for a trial such as this, and 
consequently, I am not prepared to proceed to 
trial. 
(T. 4). This admission supplements the court of appeals' discussion 
of how trial counsel expected to resolve this case through a guilty 
plea until the morning that trial began, which discussion appears at 
page 5 of the Oliver opinion. 
2. Appellate Counsel's Attempts on Direct Appeal to Demonstrate 
Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel 
On direct appeal, after private trial counsel had withdrawn 
from representing Mr. Oliver, appellate counsel, who was appointed 
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to represent Mr. Oliver, moved the court of appeals for an 
evidentiary hearing in the trial court. This motion was designed to 
establish record proof of, and dispose of, Mr. Oliver's contentions 
that the trial court's forcing trial counsel to proceed to trial 
without adequate preparation violated Mr. Oliver's rights to 
effective assistance of counsel and to due process of law. A copy 
of this motion is in Appendix 3 to this petition. The court of 
appeals denied the motion for an evidentiary hearing in the trial 
court. Mr. Oliver renewed his motion for an evidentiary hearing in 
his reply brief. 
The court of appeals assessed Mr. Oliver's due process and 
ineffective assistance claims on the merits by considering the 
evidence that was discussed in Mr. Oliver's motion for an 
evidentiary hearing,1 despite the fact that much of that evidence 
has never been developed properly or supplemented to the record in 
any traditional manner. In considering this evidence, the court of 
appeals did not mention Mr. Oliver's motion for an evidentiary 
hearing, and gave no indication as to how defense counsel on direct 
1. The court of appeals summarized three areas of evidence 
that Mr. Oliver would have addressed in the requested evidentiary 
hearing: 
[evidence that would] (1) support Oliver's 
testimony regarding his prior conviction based on 
misidentification; (2) expose weaknesses in the 
eyewitness identification testimony; and 
(3) support Mr. Oliver's assertions concerning 
possible police misconduct involved in the photo 
show up. 
Id. at 45 and 46. Mr. Oliver relied on these same three areas of 
evidence to establish the denial of his rights to due process of law 
and to effective assistance of counsel. See Appendix 2 to this 
petition. 
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appeal is to present evidence of trial counsel's ineffectiveness 
and/or the due process violation. 
REASONS WHY QUESTIONS PRESENTED JUSTIFY ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT 
A. QUESTION 1 
The first question presented for this Court's review is, 
Does a criminal defense attorney have a duty to 
prepare the defense and investigate evidence 
which is "cumulative11 to, or corroborative of, 
the defendant's testimony? 
This Court should grant a writ of certiorari on this 
question because the Oliver opinion answers this question in the 
negative, and thus conflicts with polestar opinions of this Court, 
the United States Supreme Court, and of a different panel of the 
Utah Court of Appeals. See State v. Tempiin, 805 P.2d 182, 188 
(Utah 1990); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984); 
State v. Crestani. 771 P.2d 1085, 1092 (Utah App. 1989). 
The Oliver opinion correctly notes the two-pronged showing 
a criminal defendant must make to establish a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel: "(1) that his or her counsel's performance 
was deficient; and (2) that counsel's performance prejudiced the 
defendant." Oliver at 46, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 687 (1984). 
The court of appeals held that Mr. Oliver did not establish 
the deficient performance prong of the Strickland test. The court 
of appeals' rationale was that Mr. Oliver had failed to show 
deficient performance because the evidence identified by Mr. Oliver 
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on appeal as evidence omitted by trial counsel was "cumulative" to 
Mr. Oliver's testimony, to trial counsel's cross-examination of the 
State's witnesses, and to argument presented by trial counsel. The 
court of appeals' resolution of the ineffective assistance claim is 
as follows: 
Although Oliver points to three specific 
areas in which he claims his counsel should have 
been more prepared, the record, as discussed 
regarding Oliver's due process claims,2 
establishes that his attorney presented evidence 
and argument to the jury in all of these areas. 
Any additional evidence would have been 
cumulative. Oliver has failed to demonstrate how 
his counsel's performance was deficient and 
therefore we need not address whether Oliver was 
prejudiced by such performance. 
Id. at 47. 
The Oliver analysis conflicts with Strickland, which 
provides that "counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations 
or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular 
investigations unnecessary." 466 U.S. 668, at 691. While it may be 
that a defense attorney's failure to investigate may be harmless 
2. The court's analysis of the due process issue, which 
overlaps the ineffective assistance of counsel analysis, is as 
follows: 
Defense counsel questioned Oliver about his 
previous conviction based on eyewitness 
misidentification, and again brought the prior 
misidentification to the jury's attention during 
closing argument. He cross-examined each 
eyewitness who testified and addressed the 
weaknesses of each person's testimony at length 
in his closing argument. Defense counsel also 
cross-examined Deputy Matthews about his 
investigation and the photo show up he conducted 
with at least one of the eyewitnesses. 
Id. at 46. 
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under the second prong of Strickland, a defense attorney's failure 
to investigate adequately is always deficient performance. State v. 
Tempiin. 805 P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990). 
The Oliver court's reasoning that a defense attorney has no 
duty to present evidence that is "cumulative" to the defendant's 
testimony conflicts with this Court's decision in State v. Tempiin. 
805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990). In Tempiin. this Court recognized that 
under the first prong of Strickland, defense attorneys must 
"adequately investigate ... the availability of prospective defense 
witnesses." Id. at 188. Part of the reason that this Court 
reversed Mr. Tempiin's conviction was that the trial attorney had 
failed to investigate and present witnesses to bolster Mr. Tempiin's 
testimony. Id. at 188-189. 
The Oliver court's reliance on trial counsel's performance 
at trial, in spite of trial counsel's admission that he was not 
prepared to proceed to trial, conflicts with State v. Crestani. 771 
P.2d 1085 (Utah App. 1989), which was written by a different panel 
of the court of appeals. In Crestani. the panel rejected the trial 
court's assertion that a defense attorney's inadequate preparation 
is mollified if the attorney's trial performance is superficially 
adequate. The panel stated, 
In its memorandum decision, the trial 
court stated, that "[t]here is no question that 
preparation for a trial is important but the 
final test is counsel's conduct in the 
courtroom." We think the court's emphasis is 
misplaced. Certainly, there can be no 
appropriate performance in the courtroom without 
adequate preparation, and without such 
preparation, representation is nothing but a sham 
and a pretense. 
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Id. at 1092. 
Aside from the fact that the Oliver opinion is inconsistent 
with well-established authority, the Oliver opinion undercuts the 
importance of trial preparation by criminal defense attorneys, and 
thereby impacts adversely on some of the most fundamental rights in 
our criminal justice system.3 The criminal defendants' rights to 
prepared defense counsel are perhaps the most important rights, 
because criminal defendants must rely on counsel to assert all other 
rights, and to present all defenses.4 
Because of the importance of the rights obfuscated by the 
Oliver decision, this Court should grant the writ on Question 1, and 
reiterate to the court of appeals, the lower courts, and criminal 
defense attorneys the precept that a criminal defense attorney has a 
duty to prepare the defense and investigate evidence to corroborate 
the defendant's testimony. 
3. Article I Section 12 of the Utah Constitution, included 
in Appendix 1 to this petition, contains many specific rights that 
together recognize the importance of prepared trial counsel in 
criminal cases. Article I Section 7 of the Utah Constitution also 
protects the right to present a complete defense. State v. Harding, 
635 P.2d 33 (Utah 1981). 
The right to effective assistance of counsel is protected 
by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See 
Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The right to a 
prepared defense is protected not only by the Sixth Amendment, but 
also by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 
690 (1986). 
4. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653-654 
(1984). 
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B. QUESTION 2 
The second question for this Court's review is, 
How is a criminal defense attorney on direct 
appeal to present evidence, which was not 
originally presented in the trial court, to 
establish ineffective assistance of trial counsel? 
This Court should grant a writ of certiorari on Question 2 
because this Court is constitutionally empowered to create rules of 
procedure and evidence,5 and should exercise these powers in this 
case to inform appellate attorneys and the court of appeals how to 
proceed in similar cases. 
In State v. Humphries, 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah 1991), 
this Court recognized that 
generally a claim of ineffectiveness of trial 
counsel cannot be raised on appeal because the 
trial record is insufficient to allow the claim 
to be determined. ... [H]owever, ... ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel should be raised on 
appeal if the trial record is adequate to permit 
decision of the issue and defendant is 
represented by counsel other than trial counsel. 
Id. at 7. 
Unfortunately, however, it is not always clear whether the 
trial record is adequate to dispose of the claim.6 This creates a 
dilemma for the criminal defendant and appellate counsel. On one 
5. Article VIII Section 4 of the Utah Constitution 
provides this Court's rulemaking powers. 
6. In the instant case, for instance, given the trial 
court's forcing trial counsel to trial despite trial counsel's 
admission that he had done no formal preparation and was not 
prepared to go to trial, and given the omissions of trial counsel 
that appear in the record created in the trial court, it is arguable 
that the record is adequate to establish the claim of ineffective 
(footnote continues) 
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hand, the defendant and appellate counsel are encouraged to raise 
the ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal if the record may 
be considered adequate, in order to preserve the issue,7 and because 
there is no guarantee that the defendant will be appointed counsel 
in subsequent proceedings. On the other hand, the defendant and 
appellate counsel may be wary of adjudicating the part of the claim 
(footnote 6 continued) 
assistance. See Appendix 2 to this petition, discussing record 
evidence that substantiates the claim; Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 691-696 (1984)(discussing varying degrees of prejudice 
that are presumed, or must be shown, when varying kinds of 
ineffective assistance of counsel are involved); State v. Tempiin, 
805 P.2d 182, 186 n.20 (Utah 1990)(same). Other cases demonstrate 
that it is not always clear whether the record is adequate to 
dispose of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See e.g. 
State v. Humphries, 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 6-7 (Utah 1991)(while this 
Court found the record adequate to reverse Mr. Humphries' 
conviction, it was the opinion of the State that the record was not 
adequate, and that the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel 
should be addressed in a postconviction proceeding with an 
evidentiary hearing). 
7. In Jensen v. DeLand, 795 P.2d 619 (Utah 1989), this 
Court allowed a plaintiff in postconviction relief proceedings an 
evidentiary hearing on his allegation of ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel. Id. at 621. The plaintiff's attorney on the direct 
appeal of the criminal conviction advised him that the record on 
appeal was insufficient to support the claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, and that the defendant should wait to develop 
the record in postconviction proceedings. Id. at 620-621. This 
Court did not indicate whether the attorney on direct appeal was 
correct in refusing to raise the issue on direct appeal. This Court 
remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing, 
because the record was inadequate to address the claims of 
ineffectiveness. Id. at 621. This Court warned, however, that 
appellate attorneys should raise the issue on direct appeal when 
possible, stating, 
By our decision today, we do not suggest or imply 
that a criminal defendant may strategically 
abstain from raising an ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claim which could be reviewed on 
direct appeal. We do not and will not sanction 
manipulation of that sort. 
Id. at 621. 
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that is reflected in the traditional appellate record, wishing to 
present all aspects of the claim in one forum with a better 
cumulative chance at showing prejudice from all of trial counsel's 
deficiencies.8 
In this case, appellate counsel for Mr. Oliver attempted to 
present all traditional record evidence that appears to demonstrate 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Counsel also attempted to 
identify and develop all known non-record evidence relevant to that 
claim, by moving for an evidentiary hearing. 
In the absence of any governing procedure, the court of 
appeals silently lumped the record evidence with the allegations of 
non-record evidence contained in Mr. Oliver's motion for an 
evidentiary hearing. Because much of the evidence alleged in the 
motion for an evidentiary hearing has never been developed, 
Mr. Oliver has not had a fair opportunity to establish the claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Should Mr. Oliver pursue a 
petition for postconviction relief, the court presiding over those 
proceedings will have the difficult, if not impossible, task of 
determining the finality to give to the court of appeals' decision. 
In order to protect criminal defendants' due process rights 
to thorough and meaningful adjudication of an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim, this Court should grant the writ on Question 2, 
8. See Jensen v. DeLand. 795 P.2d 619, 621 (Utah 
1989)(ineffective assistance of counsel is a due process violation 
which is reviewable in postconviction relief proceedings); Hurst v. 
Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1032-1036 (Utah 1989)(discussing application of 
res judicata and waiver doctrines in context of postconviction 
relief). 
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and establish procedural and/or evidentiary rules on how a criminal 
defense attorney on direct appeal is to present evidence, which was 
not originally presented in the trial court, to establish 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Oliver requests that this Court grant a writ of 
certiorari on Questions 1 and 2 presented in this petition. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of November, 1991, 
>ijBftodk 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, Elizabeth Holbrook, hereby certify that ten copies of 
the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Supreme Court, 332 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and four copies will be 
delivered to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114, this )]) day of November, 1991. 
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DELIVERED by this day 
of November, 1991, 
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APPENDIX 1 
OLIVER OPINION AND ORDER DENYING REHEARING 
to pay the filing fee. 
The actions of Judge Hanson were justified. 
I don't believe the legislature ever intended 
that filing fees should be waived where a party 
has retained a private attorney and has paid 
legal fees to that attorney. 
The overwhelming majority of people 
seeking divorce are struggling financially as 
they attempt to support two households on the 
same amount of money with which they pre-
viously supported one. Most could file similar 
affidavits. If only a portion of the 7,000 div-
orces filed each year in Salt Lake County 
successfully sought a waiver of filing fees, the 
cost to the taxpayers could be hundreds of 
thousands of dollars annually. 
Unfortunately, Ms. Kelsey is caught in the 
middle.6 Although I am sympathetic to her 
plight, I cannot condone the practice of court 
costs "taking a back seat" to attorney fees. 
Here, the principle involved is crucial. There-
fore, this court should stand by the decision of 
Judge Hanson and deny the petition for a writ 
of mandamus. 
. Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
1. Legal Aid Society of Salt Lake provides indigent 
representation to the Salt Lake County community. 
Other similar organizations provide legal services to 
indigents in other cities and counties in the State. 
2. Ms. Kelsey testified that she never actually dealt 
with Mr. Barnard, but with a member of his staff, 
Valerie Gylling. The Utah State Bar Directory does 
not list Valerie Gylling. Utah Code Ann. §78-51-
25 (1987) prohibits any person who is not a member 
of the bar and licensed to practice law from practi-
cing law or holding himself or herself out as an 
attorney. 
3. These means are provided by Legal Aid Society 
which, in conjunction with the Salt Lake County 
Bar pro bono program, provides local attorneys, 
who donate their time free of charge, to serve indi-
gent clients. 
4. The complaint did not even seek an award of 
attorney fees that would enable Ms. Kelsey to 
recover from the defendant the $100 that she paid to 
Mr. Barnard. 
5. Moreover, if Ms. Kelsey's immediate protection 
had been at issue, the proper action would be to 
advise her to obtain an immediate protective order 
from the district court, pursuant to the Cohabitant 
Abuse Act, Utah Code Ann. §§30-6-1 to 30-6-
11 (Supp. 1991), which does not require the assist-
ance of legal counsel nor the payment of fees. Utah 
Code Ann. §30-6-4 (Supp. 1991). 
6. If, on the other hand, Mr. Barnard were to 
return the $100 to Ms. Kelsey, there would be 
nothing to prevent Judge Hanson from waiving the 
filing fee. 
Cite as 
170 Utah Adv. Rep. 44 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
• v. 
Greg N. OLIVER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 890625-CA 
FILED: September 26, 1991 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
Honorable Michael R. Murphy 
ATTORNEYS: 
Elizabeth Holbrook, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Marian Decker, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and 
Jackson. 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Appellant Greg N. Oliver appeals his con-
viction of burglary, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202 
(1989) and theft, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 
(1989) on the bases that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion for a continuance and that 
admissible evidence supports only a misdem-
eanor theft conviction. We affirm in part, and 
reverse and remand in part. 
BACKGROUND 
At 2:30 p.m. on January 7, 1989, John 
Spielmans returned home from a basketball 
game with his son. He noticed that the side 
door to his garage, which was usually locked, 
was open. Spielmans went into the garage to 
investigate. He then saw a man dressed in a 
dark cap and dark jacket jump over a chain 
link fence ten to twelve feet away and run 
north. Spielmans began chasing the man, but 
lost sight of him. Spielmans returned home 
and noticed that the front door to his house 
was dented and that it appeared someone had 
been inside the house. He called 911 and 
waited outside for the police to arrive. While 
he was waiting, one of Spielmans's neighbors 
called his attention to a man who was leaning 
against a wooden fence across the street. 
Noting the similarity of that person's clothing 
to that of the man he had observed running 
away, Spielmans concluded it was the same 
person. Spielmans walked toward the man, 
uvti nid i t n anuuiuti ad ojjiciiiiciiii ctppi Udtucu 
him and said, "It wasn't me, man" before 
driving off. Spielmans again called 911 and 
described the car, including the license plate 
number and the direction of travel. 
When Deputy Matthews arrived to investi-
gate, Spielmans told him that a watch, a gold 
ring, four one-dollar bills and four or five 
gold Canadian coins were missing from his 
house. Deputy Matthews also spoke with 
Spielmans's neighbor who saw the man run 
across his front yard, climb into the parked 
car and speed away when Spielmans approa-
ched him. 
Deputy Matthews ran a computer check on 
the license plate of the car and obtained the 
vehicle owner's name and address. He then 
went to the vicinity of that address to invest-
igate further. He saw a man fitting the descr-
iption that Spielmans had given, exit the 
vehicle owner's residence. 
Based on his own observations, the license 
plate number of the car and the descriptions 
given by both Spielmans and his neighbor, 
Deputy Matthews obtained a picture of defe-
ndant, Greg N. Oliver, from the police records 
division. The next day, he returned to Spiel-
mans's home with the photo of Oliver and 
showed it to Spielmans, advising him that he 
had reason to believe that Oliver was the same 
person Spielmans described. Spielmans ident-
ified Oliver as the man he had seen. 
Three days after the incident, Deputy Mat-
thews assembled a photo spread, including the 
picture of Oliver and pictures of five other 
men. He showed the photo spread to Spiel-
mans, who again identified Oliver as the 
suspect. Deputy Matthews also showed the 
photo spread to three of Spielmans's neigh-
bors, two of whom identified Oliver as the 
person they had observed the day of the inci-
dent. 
Oliver was arrested and charged with one 
count of burglary, a second degree felony and 
one count of theft, a third degree felony. 
The trial judge granted two continuances 
prior to the case actually being tried. At the 
final pretrial conference, on August 28, 1989, 
Oliver's attorney told the trial judge that he 
was ready to proceed to trial and agreed to a 
trial date of September 5, 1989. 
After the pretrial conference, Oliver entered 
into plea negotiations with the State. The trial 
judge's clerk told both the State and Oliver's 
attorney, however, to prepare as if they were 
going to trial as scheduled. The night before 
trial, Oliver agreed to the State's plea prop-
osal and decided that he would enter a guilty 
plea in the morning rather than go to trial. 
The next morning, however, Oliver changed 
his mind and decided that he wanted to go to 
trial. Oliver's attorney moved for a one day 
continuance, stating that he needed more time 
jury oi unc cuum oi bciuiiu ucgree ourgiary 
and one count of third degree theft. 
ISSUES 
On appeal Oliver argues that: (1) the trial 
court's denial of his motion for a continuance 
denied him due process of law; (2) the trial 
court's denial of his motion for a continuance 
denied him effective assistance of counsel; and 
(3) admissible evidence supports only a class A 
misdemeanor theft conviction. 
ANALYSIS 
Due Process 
Oliver argues that the trial court's denial of 
his motion for a one day continuance violated 
his right to due process because it forced his 
counsel to proceed to trial without being 
adequately prepared. Oliver asserts that his 
attorney did not conduct any formal trial 
preparation after Oliver decided to plead 
guilty. Consequently, when he changed his 
mind the next morning and decided he wanted 
to go to trial, Oliver's counsel was not suffi-
ciently prepared. Oliver claims that had his 
attorney had one more day to prepare for 
trial, he would have been better prepared to: 
(1) support Oliver's testimony regarding his 
prior conviction based on misidentification; (2) 
expose weaknesses in the eyewitness identific-
ation testimony; and (3) support Oliver's 
assertions concerning possible police miscon-
duct involved in the photo show up. 
The grant or denial of a continuance is 
within the discretion of the trial court. State v. 
Humpherys, 707 P.2d 109, 109 (Utah 
1985)(per curiam); State v. Creviston, 646 
P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982); State v. Moosman, 
542 P.2d 1093, 1094 (Utah 1975). This court 
will not reverse the trial court's decision 
absent a clear abuse of discretion. Id. 
When moving for a continuance, a party 
must show that denial of the motion will 
prevent the party from obtaining material and 
admissible evidence, that any additional wit-
nesses it seeks can be produced within a reas-
onable time, and that it has exercised due 
diligence in preparing for the case before 
requesting the continuance. State v. Linden, 
761 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah 1988). Absent such 
showing, the trial court does not abuse its 
discretion if it denies the motion. Id. We are 
also persuaded by Washington precedent, that 
on appeal, the moving party must show that it 
Hvas materially prejudiced by the court's denial 
of the continuance or that the trial result 
would have been different had the continuance 
been granted. State v. Barker, 667 P.2d 108, 
114 (Wash. App. 1983), 
Oliver has failed to make the necessary 
showing required by these cases. Oliver's 
counsel did not allege that there were any 
witnesses or evidence that he needed to obtain 
^i * u i i : i « u i « L ~ J *u ,» 
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why Oliver would be prejudiced if he was 
denied the extra day. Defense counsel simply 
requested time to conduct more formal trial 
preparation. 
Oliver's counsel also failed to demonstrate 
that he exercised due diligence before reques-
ting the continuance. Oliver's attorney repre-
sented Oliver at an arrest warrant hearing, the 
pretrial conference and throughout plea neg-
otiations with the State. At the pretrial conf-
erence, eight days before trial, defense counsel 
told the trial judge that he was prepared to 
proceed to trial. After the pretrial, the trial 
judge instructed his court clerk to notify both 
the State and defense counsel that, although 
Oliver and the State were engaged in plea 
negotiations, they should prepare as if they 
were going to trial anyway. The trial judge 
stated that Oliver was having a hard time 
deciding whether or not he would accept the 
State's plea bargain and that no one would 
know until the day of trial whether or not he 
would actually enter a plea. In denying the 
motion, the trial judge stated: 
All counsel, prosecution and 
defense counsel were told that given 
circumstances, as I understand 
them, that Mr. Oliver could not 
make up his mind, that everyone 
needed to proceed, as if we were 
going to trial, and the responses we 
got from the respective offices of 
prosecution and defense is that they 
would act accordingly. 
On appeal, Oliver has failed to show that he 
was materially prejudiced by denial of this 
motion. The trial lasted two days, instead of 
only one, as scheduled. Therefore, Oliver's 
counsel had the evening of the first day and 
overnight to further prepare before the State's 
case had been fully presented. In essence, 
because the trial went two days, Oliver's 
counsel was afforded the time to prepare that 
he requested and which he would have had if 
the continuance had been granted; All of the 
State's witnesses were subject to recall by 
defense counsel and the trial judge found that 
defense counsel took full advantage of the 
opportunity to cross-examine each of them. 
Also, because the motion was denied and the 
parties had to proceed to trial, one of the 
State's witnesses was unable to appear. At the 
end of the State's case, the trial judge made 
the following statement regarding his denial of 
Oliver's motion for a continuance: 
Each of the witnesses who testi-
fied yesterday it seemed to me, that 
there was full availability of cross-
examination by [defense counsel] 
and he took advantage of that ... I 
want to make sure the record is 
been made available to the defen-
dant, to the witnesses ... and in 
fact, since the trial did not conclude 
in the first day, that there has been 
extra time to prepare, extra time to 
do whatever is necessary .... 
Furthermore, it appears to me 
that there may have been some 
benefit in the sense that this witness 
you mentioned, Mrs. Lehaman, is 
not available. 
Further, Oliver has not shown that the trial 
result would have been different had the 
continuance been granted. The record shows 
that Oliver's counsel explored all of the areas 
Oliver now complains of. Defense counsel 
questioned Oliver about his previous convic-
tion based on eye witness misidentification, 
and again brought the prior misidentification 
to the jury's attention during closing argu-
ment. He cross-examined each eyewitness 
who testified and addressed the weaknesses of 
each person's testimony at length in his 
closing argument. Defense counsel also cross-
examined Deputy Matthews about his invest-
igation and the photo show up he conducted 
with at least one of the eyewitnesses. 
Oliver did not tell his attorney that he had 
decided to plead guilty until the night before 
trial. Any formal trial preparation should have 
been done before that time. Oliver does not 
show that he was materially prejudiced by the 
court's denial of this motion or that the trial 
would have been different had the continuance 
been granted. Therefore, we find that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
the motion for a continuance and that such 
denial did not deprive Oliver of due process. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Oliver claims that the trial court's denial of 
his motion for a one day continuance denied 
him effective assistance of counsel. As in his 
due process argument, Oliver contends that his 
counsel was not sufficiently prepared to: (1) 
support Oliver's testimony regarding his prior 
conviction based on misidentification; (2) 
expose weaknesses in the eyewitness identific-
ation testimony; or (3) support Oliver's asse-
rtions concerning possible police misconduct 
involved in the photo show up. Oliver argues 
that his counsel's failure to more fully explore 
these issues constitutes ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), the United States 
Supreme Court established a two-part test 
for determining whether a criminal defen-
dant's sixth amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel has been denied. The 
defendant must show: (1) that his or her 
counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) 
that Counsel's nerfnrrrmnr* nrAinrl.^^ *u~ 
oraer to prevail, la. 
An attorney's performance is deficient when 
it falls below the objective standard of reaso-
nableness. Id. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2064-65; 
State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 
1990); Stare v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 893 
(Utah 1989). The defendant must point to 
specific instances in the record which, under 
the circumstances, show that counsel's perf-
ormance was deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066; Templin, 805 P.2d at 
186; State v. Hoyt, 806 P.2d 204, 212 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
In assessing trial counsel's performance, an 
appellate court must "'indulge a strong pres-
umption that counsel's conduct falls within 
the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance ....'" Templin, 805 P.2d at 186 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. 
Ct. at 2065). 
Although Oliver points to three specific 
areas in which he claims his counsel should 
have been more prepared, the record, as dis-
cussed regarding Oliver's due process claims, 
establishes that his attorney presented evidence 
and argument to the jury in all of these areas. 
Any additional evidence would have been 
cumulative. Oliver has failed to demonstrate 
how his counsel's performance was deficient 
and therefore we need not address whether 
Oliver was prejudiced by such performance. 
We conclude that Oliver was not denied effe-
ctive assistance of counsel. 
Admissibility of Evidence 
Oliver argues that the State failed to intro-
duce admissible evidence establishing that the 
value of the stolen property totalled over $250 
as required for a third degree felony theft 
conviction under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-
412(l)(b)(1989).i 
Spielmans reported that a watch, a ring, 
four one-dollar bills and four or five Cana-
dian coins were stolen from his home. At trial, 
Spielmans testified that the watch was worth 
one hundred twenty-five dollars, the four 
dollar bills were worth four dollars and that 
the total value of the coins was approximately 
three dollars and seventy-five cents. When 
questioned about the ring's value, the follo-
wing exchange occurred: 
Q. [THE PROSECUTOR]: And at 
the time that the ring was taken, 
did you have an opinion as to the 
value of that ring? 
A. [SPIELMANS]: I did have, and 
whatever that opinion was is refle-
cted in the police report. I don't 
recall. 
Q: You do not recall? 
A: No. 
Q: Is there anything that would 
help refresh your recollection? 
report, I believe. 
Q: I'm asking you if looking at the 
police report refreshes your recoll-
ection as to the ring. 
A: As to the ring? 
Q: As to the ring. Thank you. 
A: I'm sure it reflects what I said. I 
just 
don't recall. 
Q: ... Having looked at this report, 
this police report, does that refresh 
your recollection as to how you 
valued the ring at that time? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Okay. What was the value you 
placed on that ring at that time? 
A: I really can't recall. It states 
S200 on there. That's what I said. 
If it says $200 on there, that's what 
I said. 
The police report was not introduced into 
evidence. 
Oliver claims that Spielmans's testimony, 
based on the police report, that the ring was 
worth $200 is inadmissible because Spielmans 
lacked personal knowledge of the value and 
his memory was not refreshed by the police 
report. Therefore, Oliver contends that the 
State proved a total value of less than $250 for 
the stolen property, which constitutes a class 
A misdemeanor under §76-6-412(l)(c)2, 
rather than a felony. 
The State argues that the evidence presented 
is sufficient to sustain the felony conviction. 
Before we can assess whether the evidence is 
sufficient to support a felony theft conviction, 
we must first determine whether the evidence 
that the ring was worth $200 was properly 
admitted, as that evidence is necessary for a 
felony conviction. 
In reviewing a trial court's decision to 
admit evidence, we will not reverse that ruling 
unless a substantial right of the party has been 
affected, ^rare v. Morgan, 162 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 61, 61 (Utah App. 1991) (citing Salt Lake 
City, v. Holtman, 806 P.2d 235, 237 (Utah 
App. 1991)); Utah R. Evid. 103(a). 
Under Utah Rule of Evidence 602, a witness 
may only testify about matters of which the 
witness has personal knowledge. A witness 
may use a writing to refresh his or her 
memory for the purpose of testifying. Utah R. 
Evid. 612(1). . . . 
It is evident from the trial transcript that 
Spielmans had no independent, knowledge or 
memory of the value of the ring, nor was his 
memory refreshed after looking at the police 
report. He had no present personal knowledge 
of the ring's value and, therefore, his testi-
mony concerning the value is inadmissible. We 
find that admissible evidence sunDorts onlv a 
rore, we reverse ana remand on the telony 
theft conviction issue. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the 
trial court's denial of the motion for a conti-
nuance, and reverse and remand on the felony 
theft conviction for proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
1. Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412(1) (1989) prov-
ides: ,y 
(1) Theft of property and services as 
provided in this chapter shall be punis-
hable: 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if 
the: (i) value of the property or services 
is more than $250 but not more than 
$1000; 
2. Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412(l)(c) (1989) pro-
vides: 
(1) Theft of property and services as 
provided in this chapter shall be punis-
hable: 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the 
value of the property stolen was more 
than $100 but does not exceed $250; 
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OPINION 
BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
Defendant entered a guilty plea to ten 
counts of forgery, all second-degree felonies, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-501 
(1990), and eight counts of theft, one third-
degree felony and seven second-degree felo-
nies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-
404 (1990). Defendant subsequently attempted 
to set aside his guilty plea and resulting con-
viction by contending that the trial court did 
not strictly comply with Rule 11(5) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure as required 
by State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 
1987). His motion was denied. Defendant now 
appeals the denial of his motion to set aside 
his guilty plea. We reverse and remand. 
When defendant originally entered his guilty 
plea, the trial court conducted a colloquy with 
defendant on the record regarding his desire to 
enter his plea. During that colloquy, the court 
addressed each of defendant's constitutional 
rights enumerated in Rule 11(5). The trial 
court did not, however, ask the defendant on 
the record if he knew that by pleading guilty 
he was waiving those rights. 
Defendant asserts that the trial court's 
failure to ask him specifically if he knew that 
he was waiving his rights rendered his plea 
unacceptable under Rule 1H5).1 Rule 11(5) 
provides in pertinent part: 
The court ... may not accept the 
plea until the court has found: 
(c) the defendant knows he has 
rights against compulsory self-
incrimination, to a jury trial, and to 
confront and cross-examine in 
open court the witnesses against 
him, and that by entering the plea 
he waives all of those rights; 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(5) (emphases added). 
Defendant makes this claim even though in his 
affidavit he affirmatively acknowledged that 
he knew he was waiving each of his rights 
enumerated in Rule 1 l(5)(c). 
Recently, this court held in State v. Smith, 
812 P.2d 470,477 (Utah App.), petition for cert, 
filed, 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Utah ' 
1991), and State v. Trujillo-Martinez, 162 
Utah Adv. Rep. 64 (Utah App. 1991), that a 
trial court could consider both the colloquy and 
the affidavit in determining whether the 
defendant's plea was being entered in strict 
compliance with Rule 11(5).2 Subsequently, 
however, the Utah Supreme Court's decision 
in State v. Hoffy 164 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 
(Utah 1991) seems to have foreclosed that 
interpretation. In Hoff, the supreme court 
stated that Gibbons requires that the trial 
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APPENDIX 2 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
TEXT OF CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to appear and defend in person and 
by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, 
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by 
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory 
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in 
his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. 
In no instance shall any accused person, before 
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or 
fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The 
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence 
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband 
against his wife, nor shall any person be twice 
put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Amendment VI to the Constitution of the United States provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed 
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses 
in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
Amendment XIV to the Constitution of the United States provides: 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of 
the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
GREG N. OLIVER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
MOTION FOR SUSPENSION OF 
RULES, REMAND, AND STAY OF 
APPELLATE PROCEEDINGS 
Case No. 890625-CA 
Priority No. 2 
A. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL CONTEXT 
Mr. Oliver was tried and convicted by a jury of Burglary 
and Theft on September 5 and 6 of 1989, sentenced to the Utah State 
Prison for concurrent terms of zero to five and one to fifteen 
years, and ordered to pay restitution (R. 166-167).1 
On the first day of trial, Mr. Oliver's trial counsel moved 
for a continuance, explaining that trial counsel had expected to 
dispose of the case through a plea and had not done any preparation 
for trial of the case, "Based on that, I didn't do any formal trial 
preparation that I normally do for a trial such as this, and 
1. The district court pleadings file will be referred to 
as WR.W. The transcript of the hearing on the motion to suppress 
will be referred to as "M.H.". The transcript of the trial 
(contained in two volumes, numbered consecutively) will be referred 
to as MT.M. 
consequently, I am not prepared to proceed to trial.w (T. 4). The 
trial court apologetically denied the motion for a continuance 
(T. 9). 
Shortly after the State's case had been presented, the 
trial court made a record concerning the court's denial of the 
motion for a continuance, explicitly finding that any error in the 
denial was harmless and not prejudicial to Mr. Oliver (T. 146-147). 
Mr. Oliver seeks a remand to the trial court to establish 
that the denial of the motion for continuance resulted in the denial 
of his rights to due process of law and effective assistance of 
counsel. 
This case involves a burglary and theft that occurred on 
January 7, 1989 (R. 6-7). The prosecution of Mr. Oliver was 
primarily based on the eyewitness identification of four witnesses 
who saw a person in the vicinity of the burglary and theft. 
The essence of Mr. Oliver's defense was that the State's 
eyewitnesses had misidentified him as the person in the vicinity of 
•the burglary and theft—he testified that he had previously been 
convicted of aggravated robbery on the basis of eyewitness 
identification and that he was later acquitted of that conviction 
when his innocence was established (T. 149). His testimony on this 
point was as follows: 
Okay. Mr. Oliver, have you ever been convicted 
of a felony? 
Yes, I was. 
When was that? 
First, it was back in '83. I was convicted of 
aggravated robbery, and the jury trial was 
convicted because I have this blond hair. A year 
later they caught the guys that did it, and I was 
acquitted. 
Okay. 
They took me from prison and brought me back here 
to jail, and I—in '82 I had mv right hand 
severed off and I filled a prescription and— 
Forged a prescription? 
I altered it. I filled it. Somebody else forced 
it. I filled it and the doctor give me Motrin. 
Were vou convicted for that? 
Yes. The put that—charged me in that and 
convicted me of that and sentenced me back to 
prison. 
Then vou were on parole? 
Yes. Thev let me out on parole after that. And 
I expirated in November of /88. 
(T. 149-150)(emphasis added).2 
As is discernable from examination of the emphasized 
portion of Mr. Oliver's testimony, supra, there were problems with 
Mr. Oliver's credibility. In addition to his admission that he had 
been involved in and convicted of forgery, the jurors were also 
faced with Officer Matthews' testimony that Officer Matthews had a 
hunch that the offender in this case was Mr. Oliver (T. 116). 
Officer Matthews also indicated that when Mr. Spielmans reported the 
crime, Mr. Spielmans seemed to think that he knew the suspect from 
his work with Adult Probation and Parole (T. 124). 
2. In closing argument, trial counsel argued, in part, as 
follows: 
Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Oliver, as he testified 
was sent to prison once on mistaken identity. 
And was released when they caught the right 
person. I would ask you not let that happen 
again, to review this evidence and bring back a 
verdict of not guilty on both charges. 
(T. 201). 
Trial counsel should have procured evidence to support 
Mr. Oliver's testimony. A review of the district court pleadings 
file in the 1982 case referred to by Mr. Oliver establishes that 
Mr. Oliver was in fact convicted and that the conviction was later 
set aside when the actual perpetrators confessed. Trial counsel for 
Mr. Oliver in the 1982 case indicates that the basis of that 
conviction was misidentification of Mr. Oliver. See Appendix 1# 
containing the affidavit of counsel; Appendix 2, containing 
certified documents from the district court pleadings file in the 
1982 misidentification, aggravated robbery case; State v. Tempiin, 
149 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah 1990)(ineffective assistance of counsel 
established when trial counsel failed to call witness to corroborate 
defendant's testimony). 
The trial court should have granted the motion for the 
continuance so that trial counsel could prepare to represent 
Mr. Oliver. 
Salt Lake Sheriff's Deputy, Kevin Matthews, testified that 
in investigating this case on January 7, he had an idea that the 
suspect was Mr. Oliver, and so he obtained a photograph of 
Mr. Oliver through the records division of the Department of 
Corrections and took it to Mr. Spielmans for identification 
(T. 116). He indicated that when he showed Mr. Oliver's photograph 
to Mr. Spielmans, he told Mr. Spielmans that he had "reason"to 
believe this may be the person that entered his residence earlier 
that day" (T. 117). When Officer Matthews asked Mr. Spielmans if 
Mr. Spielmans could identify the person in the photo, Mr. Spielmans 
pointed at the photo and said, "That's the guy." (T. 117).3 
When asked if he showed the single photo to any of the 
other witnesses, he did not recall having done so (T. 116). His 
police report indicated, "I contacted the witnesses at their 
residences, . . . and they were able to pick Mr. Oliver out a[s] the 
suspect in the burglary from a picture." (T. 122-123) (emphasis 
added). Officer Matthews tried to explain the report by noting that 
he may have shown the photo to Mr. Spielmans' son, who did not see a 
suspect at the scene of the crime (T. 122). When asked repeatedly 
about the discrepancy between the report and his testimony, Officer 
Matthews would not commit himself, answering with phrases like "I 
don't believe" and "all I remember" (T. 123). 
As is demonstrated by review of the record in this case, 
trial counsel did not ask two of the four eyewitnesses if Officer 
Matthews had shown them the one photo, mug shot show up of 
Mr. Oliver prior to their exposure to the photo array, the line-up, 
or Mr. Oliver's in-court appearance (T. 83-95; 95-102). 
Trial counsel should have addressed the possibility that 
three of the four eyewitnesses were improperly tainted by the one 
3. Compare Officer Matthews' testimony at the motion to 
suppress, "And Mr. Spielmans observed the picture and stated that he 
felt positive that that was the suspect." (M.H. 267, 271-272) ~ 
Compare Mr. Spielmans' testimony that he indicated that the photo 
appeared to be the person (T. 52). 
photo, mug shot show up.4 
The trial court should have granted the motion for the 
continuance so that trial counsel could prepare to represent 
Mr. Oliver. 
As was discussed above, at least one of the eyewitnesses 
was shown a one photo, mug shot show up the day after the crime, and 
was subsequently shown a photo array and line-up, and identified 
Mr. Oliver as the perpetrator of the crime in this case (T. 52, 54, 
58, 61, 116-117, 127-128; R. 3, M.H. 233-234). 
The same mug shot used in that show up was placed in the 
photo array that was shown to all of the State's witnesses 
(M.H. 228-230, in Appendix 3). 
At the pretrial motion to suppress eyewitness 
identification, Mr. Oliver was represented by Lynn R. Brown of the 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association (M.H. 219). However, at trial, 
Mr. Oliver was represented by new, private counsel. The prosecutor 
and trial court apparently forgot that the mug shot (State's 
Exhibit 1 from the motion to suppress) was part of the photo array, 
and thought that the one photo from the show up had been lost 
(T. 52-53, 59-60, in Appendix 4). 
4. The eyewitness who indicated that she was not shown the 
one photo, mug shot show up identified Mr. Oliver in the photo array-
and did not identify anyone at the line up or at trial (T. 78-8D) . 
questioned by the police or given an opportunity to tell his side of 
the story (T. 151, 163). 
Trial counsel should have reviewed the motion to suppress 
and addressed the prejudice arising from this repeated suggestion of 
Mr. Oliver's mug shot in the show up and then in the photo array. 
The trial court should have granted the motion for the 
continuance so that trial counsel could prepare to represent 
Mr. Oliver. 
The essence of Mr. Oliver's view of the case was that he 
was innocent and that his conviction was based on police misbehavior 
and failure to investigate honestly. He indicated that he was never 
questioned by the police or given an opportunity to tell his side of 
the story (T. 151, 163). 
Although Mr. Oliver indicated that his parole had expired 
in November of 1988 (T. 150), he was arrested by three parole 
officers (T. 156-157). 
He disputed Officer Matthews' testimony that Mr. Oliver had 
evaded Officer Matthews during the investigation of the crime 
(T. 108-112), indicating that Mr. Oliver did not hear a siren, and 
asking that Officer Matthews be recalled and asked if Officer 
Matthews had turned his red light on (T. 155-156, 165). While 
Officer Matthews testified that he saw Mr. Oliver exiting Karen 
Weed's home during the alleged evasion, Mr. Oliver indicated that a 
photograph of the scene would have shown that from where Officer 
Matthews was standing, his view of Karen Weed's home was blocked~"by 
a fence (T.160-161). 
Trial counsel should have sought the evidence necessary to 
corroborate Mr. Oliver's testimony concerning the police misconduct 
in this case, which may have borne directly on Officer Matthews' 
credibility and the identification procedures used in this case. 
See Tempiin. supra. 
The trial court should have granted the motion for the 
continuance so that trial counsel could prepare to represent 
Mr. Oliver. 
B. LEGAL BASIS FOR ALLEGATIONS OF DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Article I section 7 of the Utah Constitution guarantees all 
people the right to due process of law: "No person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." 
Article I section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides more specific 
protections to those accused of crime: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to appear and defend in person and 
by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, 
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by 
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory 
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in 
his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. 
In no instance shall any accused person, before 
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or 
fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The 
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence 
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband 
against his wife, nor shall any person be twice 
put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
The sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States 
Constitution provide the accused with rights to due process and 
assistance of counsel.5 
These constitutional provisions and the counterparts have 
been interpreted and applied in contexts similar to the instant one, 
and support Mr. Oliver's assertions that the trial court's denial of 
the motion for continuance, trial counsel's lack of preparation in 
this case, and improper identification procedures and other police 
misconduct denied him due process of law and effective assistance of 
counsel and void his convictions. E.a«. Nelson v. Johnson. 669 P.2d 
1207 (Utah 1983)(component of due process is provision of adequate 
time for preparation of defense); State v. Tempi in, 149 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 14 (Utah 1990)(effective assistance of counsel requires 
5. The sixth amendment provides, 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed 
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses 
in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment provides, 
All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of 
the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
investigation and preparation of defense); State v. Thamer, 777 P.2d 
432 (Utah 1989)(due process requires reliable eyewitness 
identification).6 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Oliver seeks a remand to the trial court to determine 
whether trial counsel's performance was objectively deficient and 
prejudicial, Strickland v. Washington; 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and 
to determine whether the trial court's failure to grant the 
continuance and the improper identification procedures require a new 
trial in this case. 
In the alternative, Mr. Oliver requests that the due date 
for his opening brief be extended until fifteen days after 
disposition of the motion to remand. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of Jctnuary, 1991. 
iL"!rzXBETH<HOJdBROOK 
Ltto^ney fojr) Mr. Oliver 
6. Mr. Oliver is aware that in order to rely on the Utah_ 
Constitution, he must present adequate briefing on the matter in the 
trial court, State v. Earl. 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986), and intends to 
do so in the event that this Court grants the remand. 
DELIVERED/MAILED a copy of the foregoing t o the Attorney 
General 's Off ice , 236 State Capitol, S a l t Lake City, Utah 84114, 
t h i s c ^ ^ d a v of il.jnu.iry, 1491. 
7^ 
Appendix 1 
(to motion for evidentiary hearing) 
ELIZABETH HOLBROOK, #5292 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 Southf Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : AFFIDAVIT 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v : 
GREG N OLIV ER, : 
Case No- 890625-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Priority No• 2 
STATE OF UTAH Ji Or ijl'Ail 
) ss: s-r 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I , ELIZABETH HOLBROOK,. declarer under: penalty: of. perjury p.:-r.c.i-:y 
that the following is true and correct:^ L. *•- r;i i^ rr':.;.; 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State 
of O'tcih an I employed as an appellate attorney at the Salt Lake Legal 
Defender Association. 
2. I am the attorney appointed to represent GREG N. OLIVER 
in the above-captioned case during the pendency of his appeal* 
3. I was not present during the trial of this matter and 
did not represent Mr. Oliver at trial. 
4. I have spoken with Robert N. Macri, the attorney who 
represented Mr. Oliver in the aggravated robbery/misidentification 
case documented in Appendix 2 to th i s brief. 
5. It is my understanding from talking to Mr. Maori that: 
(a) in that aggravated robbery case, Mr. Oliver was 
convicted on the basis of eyewitness identification 
testimony of two witnesses; 
(b) Mr. Oliver was later acquitted of that charge when 
the real perpetrator of the crime was found. 
(c) Visual comparison of Mr. Oliver and the 
perpetrator of the aggravated robbery demonstrates 
effectively Mr. Oliver's argument that eyewitness 
identification/is unreliable. 
DATED this f 1) day of January. 1991. 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this / £> , day of 
January, 1991. _ 
i f e A ^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC ' 
Residing in Sa l t Lake City , Utah 
My Commission Expires: commission E: 
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.J 
In the District Court of Davis County F I L E D 
State of Utah jULi 9^93 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
GREGORY NESS OLIVER 
Plaintiff 
^ Defendant 
HtCHAELG.AULPHIN.CUuk 
Owrfs County. Utah 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
AND COMMITMENT TO THE 
UTAH STATE PRISON 
Case No. 4213 
That when**, aid defendants GREGORY NESS OLIVER 
having heretofore on the 9 t h day of J"tie , A D. 19 83 , 
Having been convicted by a Jury
 m t ^ 3 , ^ of the 
FWtGwtty «r a w t l w Cw»wm »y a Jwrr 1* Of 
the charge of Aggravated Robbery, Second degree felony . 
£ felony 
^ ^ ind now being present in court, accompanied by his attorney, and ready for sentence, thereupon the 
[ J court renders its Judgment as follows: 
You, Gregory Nffna Oliver _ _ 
having 
U - _ _ _ _ Having been convicted by a Jury _ ^ ^
 c m t adjlld|SCS y ^ to 
be guilty and it is the judgment of the court and the sentence ot the law tliat you ..., 
Gregory Ness Oliver _ _ _ . , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ 
for your said offense do be confined in the Utah State Prison for the term of *«• m « f » — _ 
years
 s _ 
EP IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the said 
Gregory Ness Oliver _ _ _ _ 
« _ — _ _ — _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . — , be sentenced to imprisonment 
in the Utah State Prison for a term of on* to fifca«n years, Aim-^Y-RESTITmOK^X-—, 
THE AMOUNT OF $550.00. _ _____ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
said sentence to begin as of J u n« 2 8 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1 9 J 2 -
NOW, THEREFORE, you Gregory HMM Oliver _ _ _ _ _ . , _ _ , _ _ . _ _ _ , _ 
- the 
above named defendant , are remanded into the custody ot the Sheriff of Davis County, State of 
Utah, to be by htm delivered into the custody of the Warden, or other proper officer of said Utah 
State Prison in execution of this judgment and sentence. 
WITNESS: Honorable Douglas L Coraaby — - , 
Judge, and the seal of the District Court ot the Second Judicial District in and for the State of 
Utah affix*! this 28 day of Jm» _ _ . ., A. D. 19—33 
QDNEY W., WAUSJL 
By 
Clerk of the District Court of the Second 
Judicial District in and for Davis County, 
^^ State of Utah. 
. - ^ ^ 
Received "ttfir^thi day of Juna, 1983, from Brant Johnaoa, Sheriff of Davia 
County. Utah, tha paraon of Gregory Haaa Oliver for tha tarn of 1 to 15 Tra 
at thJtStkh State?-Prlaon for Aggr. Bobbery. 
Alao 1 Tr for Theft. 
I.D. 4 
ftf?* 
Circuit Court, State of Utah 
Davis County, Bountiful Department 
sTAigoFvuTAgvv J C o m m i t m e n t 
U-979 GREGORY NESS OLIVER 
at. 
Defendant 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE STATE OF UTAH: 
The above-named defendant has been charged with the crime of 
TWFFT . , 
BOUNTIFUL. DAVIS COUNTY. UTAH 
A~~ JULY 15. 1980 
( X) The defendant was found guilty and was sentenced to pay i line of 
s 00 and to be imprisoned in the county jail for ^fiS days and 
. 0 days of the imprisonment was suspended upon payment of the fine. 
YOU AR£ COMMANDED to takr the defrndanr into nur mstody and safety keep chr defendant 
( 30 until he shall serve out the imprisonment of _ _ _ 3 £ o days. 
Cp~,%1 u,^»^^. TWT.S TTMF MAY BF SF3VFB CONCTTKHFNTT.Y WTTH ANV 
JATT, <;TT>jTFNrF r>TC,TT?Trr mtTPT MTCWT K W f\K MP ill u p
 n ^ TTTNF ?g TQflT 
TF THF SFNTFNrE TM TITC/niTrT mTTRT TC T F c c TW^M 1 VTAP^ M? m TV?P Mrrc-r 
rDMPT.FTF TWF VFAP. ON THF CF>TTFMrg AM TXTTC rVAPrjr 
1 
T^-—4 TTrMTT 07 1 Q * n r w, /s ) r 
ROBERT MACSI, "Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant 
354 East 600 South 
Salt Lake City 84111 - • • ; • : • ; .* 
Tel 354-3018 J .----.— 
IS THE DAVIS COUNTY DISTRICT ' . ^-V: '''iTT/./'Z''* 
COURT OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff : : 
> MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
vs. ••• and NOTICE OF HEARING 
GREGORY NESS OLIVER, • No. Cr 4215 
Defendant * 
COMES NOT DEFENDANT GREGORY N. OLIVER, through his attorney of record, and 
moves this Court for a new trial'in the above captioned matter for the reason ,;.;">. 
that newly discovered evidence proves conclusively that Defendant did not 
commit: /the crime for .which heJias.J>een declared guilty wai^cmtesstona^s.^tj^^^^ 
obtained by Davis County law enforcement officials from the guilty parties 
require that such new trial be granted*—- ..7-- ••- -.-~K.r*<i 
Dated tnis 13th Au3U3t,-1983. .- .;.r.^^t 'va- " ' 
Robert Macri 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Please note that Defendant's Motion for New Trial will be heard Tuesday, August 16, 
1983 in the above captioned Court at the Suwxr of 1:30 P.M# or a3 soon thereafter 
as same may be heard• ' f\ 
! / j A 
Certificate of Mailine 
I certify I mailed a copy of the foregoing Motion for New Trial and Notice of 
Hearing to Mr« Mel Wilson, Esq., Deputy County Attomay, Davis County Courthouse, 
Faraington Utah 34025. postpaid this 13th^August, 1983. 
S - .•.C/-JT.4H ) f t . A . 
arjr.T- c? DAVIS ) » ( A / J ,
 r / t o . , 
I 71-2 «J.%l25.«iG>lFn m rou> ^ e -w^ ~. < < V ^ W / ' v<L I^G^ 
^
w 4 J u
- " ^ O "* ORIG'KAL DOCUMENT ON 
RLSitf Mr 'J>??C2 AS SUCH CL23JC 
WITMcSS MY K/NC SEAL OF SAID OFFICE 
THIS J L 2 - DAY OF U(°C_.
 i g £Q 
In die District Court of die Second Judicial District 
IN MIB V\)R THE 
_ County of Davis, State of Utah 
STA1E OF UTAH 
Plaintiff 
¥3 . 
GREGORY NESS OLIVER 
MINUTE ENTRY 
j ^ p August 16, 1983 
Civ No, 4 2 1 5 
CALVTN GOULD 
.» Judge 
Defendant J 3 . Jones, Reporter C. Long, Clerk 
This matter comes before the Court for hearing on Motion for 
New Tria l with Ifielvin C. Wilson, Esq. appearing as coxmsel for p la int i f f . 
Defendant i s present and represented by Robert Macri, Esq. 
P l a i n t i f f ' s counsel makes statement to the Court representing 
there has been further invest igat ion in th i s matter, and based upon 
that inves t igat ion and copies of confessions of two other parties , moves 
t o dismiss th i s case. 
Court orders the defendant released from custody of the Utah 
State Mr i s on. Motion granted. 
CClfNT/CFOAVlS ) ^ E DISTRICT 
• I Q C\^ £L>% — — — 19-i^r 
THB-lS-DAYOF. ^ < ^ _ 
BY 
ALYSONE-BROWN. 
Q 
LU 
-J 
Li-
ra THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTR£9£ rgy^yvf ^ j | C S 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTA^gQ SEP" 19 AH II: k7 
2 M DISTRICT COUST 
THE STATE OF UTAH/ 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
GREGORY N. OLIVER 
Defendant. 
BY. 46 
KPUTY OS» 
ORDER RELEASING EVIDENCE 
Case No. 4215 
The above matter having come before the Court at the 
request of the Defendant for an Order releasing evidence and it 
appearing to the Court that the previous conviction having been 
set aside and the Information dismissed and all time periods for 
appeal having elapsed; 
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of 
the Court* shall release to Gregory Oliver one levi jacket presently 
being held in evidence in regards to the above-mentioned case. 
Dated this /£- day of September, 1983. 
Second District Judge 
» 
•• ~ -± .•••-:,-V:-;-^': C*-EB;< o* THE ois-nicT 
z : r • a? >A «.:COUMTY.UTAHCCHEREBYcsn-
~ ? '• " V i r ->?i/.:;«*oC£D AMD?Cn2CCi«G'SATOUS 
.*;--0 rVU. 'Zi-t £)P AM CSIGiNAi. DOCUMENT ON 
FiLZ ;-i :•*? Qr'i-ZS. Mi SUCH CL2HK. 
WITNESS MY HAND SEAL OF SAIO OFFICE 
BY 
/ ALYSCN E. SHOWN. CLERK 
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that, time? 
A 
Honor? 
Yes, he did. 
And did he show you:one^br more?pictures? 
One picture. 
MS. BYRNE: May I approach the witness, Your 
THE COURT: You may. 
MS. BYRNE: Your Honor, do we need this marked 
for this hearing; jfor purposes^of this hearing? 
MR. BROWN: For purposes- of my mo tl on, 1 would 
like the picture separated from the others as a~separate 
exhibit. 
THE COURT: Let nie ask you this; if this matter' 
goes to trial, is the photo array going to be an exhibit? 
MS. BYRNE: ' Yes, it vill be; Your "Honor; 
THE COURT: How a re those attached :i n the folder? 
MS. BYRNE: I was just checking that here. They 
seem to be affixed on two sides with Scotch tape. 
THE COURT: Why don't we do this, why don't we. 
take the picture in question from the photo array and mark 
it on the back. 
MS. BYRNE: All right, 
THE COURT: That way, if we need the entire array 
again we will have a clear record of everything. 
MS. BYRNE: Wo .mi qomcj to use the photo array 
228 
again immediately after this, so— 
THE COURT: All right. Then you can put the 
individually-marked picture back in, or it can be just 
loose. 
MS. BYRNE: You have seen that? 
MR- BROWN: Yes. 
Q (By Ms. Byrne) I am showing you what has been 
marked as Statefs Exhibit No. 1 for identification. Have 
you seen that picture before? 
THE COURT: Mr. Brown, can., the record reflect 
that the picture in question is only the picture on the 
left side as you look at that exhibit, rather than both 
pictures? 
MS. BYRNE: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. BROWN: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. 
THE WITNESS: It seems to be the exact picture I 
saw. 
Q (By Ms. Byrne) And to the best— 
MR. BROWN: To clear that up, the exact picture 
you saw— 
MS. BYRNE: That»s what I was about to do. But 
go ahead, if you would like. 
MR. BROWN: Go ahead. 
MS. BYRNE: Okay. 
229 
C? (By Ms, Byrne) So to the best of your. 
recollection, this is a picture that Officer Matthews' 
showed you on January 8? 
A That's right. -
0" Du you recall what time of* day that was? 
A Late afternoon, I believe. Could have been 3:00. 
3:00 to 6:00. I'm not really— I can't be *ore precise 
t h a r "• »:. 
At the time Officer Matthews showed you that 
picture, did he ask you any questions at that; t Ime? 
A can recall precisely. 
Q Did you make amy statement when you saw that 
picture? «* piciurs? 
,"!, believe I said I t appears to be. 
Q You would have, said" it appears* to b e — i-Xt^cp^rs 
appears to be? 
A Sfes. 
Q It appears to be what? 
A The individual that I saw the day previously. 
Q At' JtiV t .me after January 8, did he show you any 
other pictures? 
A Detective Matthews did not. 
Q Did another of fflcei show you any pictures? 
A Yes, Detective Carr showed me a photo spread. 
MS. BYRNE: For the record, I have taken what was 
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marked as State's Exhibit No. 1 and I have placed it in its 
original position in the six-picture lineup that has been 
marked as State's Exhibit No. 2. 
Q (By Ms. Byrne) Looking at State's Exhibit No. 2, 
do you recognize that? 
A I recognize it as the defendant? 
Q Excuse me? 
A I recognize that guy as the defendant. 
Q Do you recognize that photo spread as a whole? 
A It's the same format. I can't say the other 
pictures are the same. 
Q You can't say it's the same one you were shown 
before? 
A Yes. But it's the same format. 
Q And at the time you were shown the photo spread 
containing six pictures by another officer, did you at that 
time pick out a person that you believed to be the one you 
saw on January 7? 
A I did. 
Q And what, i f any, statement did you make 
concerning the ident i f i ca t ion to the detect ive who showed 
you that photo spread? 
A That I f e l t the picture I had ident i f ied was the 
person I ' d seen and chased. 
Q I'm sorry, you f e l t that what? 
231 
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k I did. 
a Did he ask any questions about that photooraoh? 
1 He asked me if that photograph was:the ..individual 
who had burglarized my home. 
ft Did you make a response to that question? 
k Yes. I indicated that it appeared to be. 
ft It appeared to be what? 
k The defendant. 
ft I'm sorry, you said it appeared to be what? 
k I said the photograph appeared to be that of 
the defendant. 
ft Okay. Well, at that time there would not have 
been a defendant. Who did you indicate that was a photograph] 
of? 
k I indicated it appeared to be a photograph of 
the individual who had burglarized my home. 
MS. BYRNE: Your Honor, may we approach the 
bench for a moment on a matter of the picture? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
[Bench conference off the record.] 
MS. BYBNE: If I may have a moment, your Honor. 
I seem to have misplaced an item of evidence that the next 
question would be concerning. If the Court was planning 
to take a break for the benefit of the reporter, I wonder 
if I could request it be now so I could trot back across 
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photograph 
can1 
back 
and , 
THE 
that 
MS. 
THE 
see if I 
COURT: 
: may have left it on my desk. 
Well, it's a little bit early. The 
you have asked him about? 
'BYRNE: 
COURT: 
There's another:one. ^r:-. ^ r^.a^ .&\-o:.J 
Well, is there any reason why we 
t proceed to the next series of questions, then come 
. to that? : 
MS. 
THE 
It's at 
BYRNE: 
COURT: 
least clear in my mind. 
We can. 
If we come back in an hour with 
the picture I, at least, would remember Mr. Spielmans1 
testimony that he just gave, and I can't assume anything 
less on the part of .the .jury. 
MS. BYRNE: I'm sorry, your Honor. 
THE COURT: I'm sure the jury will figure it 
out. I just don't want to take a break now. 
MS. BYRNE: When was the Court planning on taking} 
the break? 
THE COURT: Probably about quarter to 3:00. 
If you finish before then, we can always come back. I'm 
sure the jury is going to understand, even though it may 
be out of order a little bit. 
MS. BYRNE: That's fine. 
Q, After the occasion when you looked at this one 
picture, were you then shown further pictures after that? 
A. Yes. Sometime later. I believe it was a week 
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home was burglarized, if you were to see the person that 
you saw jumping over the fence at the side of your house 
again, would you be able to recognize that person? 
A. I would. 
ft And is that person in the courtroom today? 
A. Yes, he is. 
ft And would you point him out for the jury, please? 
A. Gentleman in the ski sweater, the defendants 
table. 
MS. BYRNE: May the record reflect that he has 
identified the defendant, Mr. Greg Oliver? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: No objection. 
THE COURT: The record will so reflect. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: And to the best of your recollection 
is that person that you just identified present at the 
lineup that you observed? 
A. Yes. 
ft And is that person you picked out in the lineup? 
A. It is. 
ft And in the photo spread of six individuals that 
you observed, was the person's picture in that photo lineup? 
A. It was. 
ft And is that the same person you have picked 
out in the photo lineup? 
A. It is. 
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MS. BYRNE: Your Honor, the State has no further 
questions. 
THE COURT: Why don't we take a break now, then 
you can run and 
MS. BYRNE: I was, subject to that. 
THE COURT: Members of the jury, we are going 
to take a break at this time. During which time Mrs. Byrne 
will get the pictures she needs. Remember the admonition 
of the Court is to not discuss this matter with anyone, 
including among yourselves, do not form or express any 
opinions or conclusions. And is ten minutes enough, 
Mrs. Byrne? 
MS. BYRNE: I hope so, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. We'll try to keep this 
break to ten minutes if we can. See you then. 
[Whereupon, the jury exited the courtroom.] 
THE COURT: Do you have any jury instructions 
for me? 
MS. BYRNE: I do. 
THE COURT: Anything else we need to address? 
If not, we'll be in recess. 
Recess 
THE COURT: Go ahead, Ms. Byrne. 
MS. BYRNE: Your Honor, Mr. Warner, who I 
indicated earlier is an investigator with our office, is 
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1 here now. I would like to have him with me, if for no other 
2 reason, in case I misplace something else during at least 
3 the afternoon proceedings. I have discussed it with 
4 Mr. McCaughey and he has no objection. 
5 MR. McCAUGHEY: That's correct, your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: All right. Members of the jury, 
7 Mr. Warner will be *n exception to the exclusionary rule. 
8 There is an exception to that, and that is for a witness 
9 who is present is necessary to aid counsel in the 
10 presentation of the case. Mr. Warner appears to fit that 
11 exception, and Mr. McCaughey has agreed that he can stay, 
12 so he will be with us. 
13 Go ahead, 
14 MS. BYRNE: Thank you, your Honor. 
15 ft Mr. Spielmans, showing you what's been marked 
16 as State's Exhibit 15 for identification, do you recognize 
17 that? You may want to look on both sides. 
15 I k This appears to be the photo spread that I was 
19 J shown at the sheriff's office. 
20 ft Okay. And that would have been when? 
21 A Somewhat more than a week after the event, I 
22 believe. I don't recall the exact date. 
23 MS. BYRNE: State would move to have what has 
24 been marked as State's Exhibit 15 introduced into evidence. 
25 MR. McCAUGHEY: No objection. 
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